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LIABILITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FEES 
 
M Carnelley* 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The South African Schools Act
1 provides that "a parent is liable to pay the school 
fees determined in terms of section 39 unless and to the extent that he or she has 
been  exempted  from  payment  in  terms  of  the  Act."
2  This provision  prima  facie 
confirms the common law duty on all parents to maintain their children.
3 The Act, 
however, goes further than the common law when it defines a "parent" to mean: 
 
(a)  the parent or guardian of the child; 
(b)  the person legally entitled to custody of the learner; or 
(c)  the person who undertakes to fulfil the obligation of a person referred to in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) towards the learner's education at school.
4 
 
This  definition  was  narrowly  defined  by  the  Northern  Cape  High  Court  in 
Bestuursraad van die Laerskool Sentraal, Kakamas v Van Kradenburg.
5 The court 
found that, with regard to the payment of school fees, the term "parent" in the SASA 
includes only the custodian parent and not both parents. The court based its decision 
on the earlier decision of the Cape High Court in Bestuursliggaam van Gene Louw 
Laerskool  v  Roodtman,
6  where  it  was  found  that  the  term  "parent"  in  the  (now 
repealed) Education Affairs Act (House of Assembly)
7 should be interpreted to mean 
only the custodian parent.
8 
 
                                                 
*  Marita Carnelley. BA LLB (Stell) LLM (UNISA) PhD (Amsterdam). Professor of Law, University of 
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1  South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (hereinafter the SASA). 
2  Section 40(1) SASA. 
3  There  is  a  duty  on  both  parents  to  maintain  their  children  and  this  duty  specifically  includes 
providing  children  with  suitable  education  (s  15(2)  Maintenance  Act  99  of  1998;  s  18(2)(d) 
Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
4  Section 1 SASA. 
5  Bestuursraad van die Laerskool Sentraal, Kakamas v Van Kradenburg 2008 JOL 21631 (NC) 
para 13 (hereinafter Van Kradenburg). 
6  Bestuursliggaam  van  Gene  Louw  Laerskool  v  Roodtman  2003  2  All  SA  87  (C)  (hereinafter 
Roodtman). 
7  Education Affairs Act (House of Assembly) 70 of 1988.  
8  The court based its decision on the interpretation of the term throughout the statute (Roodtman 
96). M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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The  practical  implication  of  these  cases  was  that  a  school  could  not,  where  the 
parents  were  living  separately,
9  claim any outstanding school fees from the non -
custodian parent, unless he or she either cont racted directly with the school or 
another foundation for the existing claim.
10 Although the custodian parent remained 
solely liable for  the  school fees, he or she could nevertheless, in terms of the 
common law, claim from the non-custodian parent any amount paid in excess of his 
or her share of the maintenance of the child in general. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in the case of Fish Hoek Primary School v GW,
11 took 
a different view from  Roodtman  and  Van  Kradenburg.  The  SCA  found  that  the 
definition of a "parent" in the SASA is wide enough to include any parent of the child 
– regardless of the relationship between the parents of the child and regardless of 
whether the parent has any parental authority over the child. At issue, in casu, was 
the payment of school fees for a child born of unmarried parents in instances where 
the  father  did  not  have  any  parental  authority  over  the  child.
12  Consequently, a 
school could claim payment of outstanding school fees from both parents, including 
the non-custodian parent, regardless of the relationship or the marital status of the 
parents. 
 
The principle of liability for school fees in the SASA is broadly based on the common 
law duty to maintain. This is, however, only one side of the coin, as the liability for 
school fees may also be based on a variety of other legal principles. 
 
This article sets out to address, firstly, the issue of who is liable for paying school 
fees and secondly, the (other) possible bases for such a liability. In view hereof this 
article aims at discussing the provisions of the SASA in  the light of the  Children's 
Act
13  and  various  judgments.  Particular  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  Fish  Hoek 
Primary School judgment, and establishing who is responsible for the educational 
                                                 
9  In both of these matters the parents of the children were divorced and the court had made a care 
(custody) order. 
10  Where  the  non-custodian  parent  contracted  with  the  school  for  payment  of  the  fees,  he/she 
would be liable in terms of the contract. See discussion infra. 
11  Fish Hoek Primary School v GW 2009 JOL 24624 (SCA) (hereinafter Fish Hoek Primary School). 
12  The father was neither the guardian nor the custodian of the child and there was no access or 
contact order. 
13  Children's Act 38 of 2005. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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needs of the child at school level in instances where parties have the ability to pay 
school fees. The exposition goes wider than "parents," and includes references to 
"guardians," "custodians" and "persons who voluntary undertake the responsibility." 
This part of the discussion thus focuses on the common law maintenance duty of 
various persons as amended by statute. The second aim is to extend the enquiry to 
other  possible  legal  foundations  for  claims  by  the  school  in  their  pursuit  of  the 
payment of school fees, which include a claim based on contract, the concept of 
household  necessaries,  stipulatio  alteri,  negotiorum  gestio  and  unjustified 
enrichment. 
 
Certain issues are deliberately excluded from this discussion, namely the choice of 
school,
14 the process of the determination of the school fees at a particular school,
15  
the possible exemptions granted to indigent parents from the obligation to pay school 
fees,
16 an increase of the fees subsequent to enrolment,
17 the issue of school fees at 
private schools,
18 and lastly, the responsibility for post-school education.
19 
 
                                                 
14  Mawdsley and Beckmann 2006 De Jure 379. As an aside, an additional complicating factor is 
that traditionally, where the parents are divorced, it is the custodian parent that makes the final 
decision regarding the schooling of the child. The AD in Calitz v Calitz 1939 AD 56 63 already 
decided that it is the custodian parent who is in control of the minor's education (Simleit v Cunliffe 
1940 TPD 67 76; Mitchell v Mitchell 1904 TS 130). This is the case with the choice of school 
(Matthee v MacGregor Auld 1981 4 SA 637 (Z) 640D-F; Niemeyer v De Villiers 1951 4 SA 100 T 
103-4). Courts are hesitant to interfere with this right where it has been properly awarded and the 
decision is reasonable (F v F 2006 1 All SA 571 (SCA)). This results in the fact that the non-
custodian parent has no final say in the school that the child is attending, but remains liable for 
the pro rata share of the school fees (Fish Hoek Primary School para 14). Whether or not s 31 of 
the Children's Act will mitigate this problem, remains to be seen. A full discussion of this point 
falls outside the scope of this article, however. 
15  In this regard see Veriava 2007 SAJHR 180; Reschovsky 2006 Comparative Education Review 
21; Visser 2004 De Jure 358; Visser 2006 Speculum Juris 112; Visser 2007 THRHR 107. 
16  Visser 2007 De Jure 156; Visser 2008 THRHR 119. 
17  Springvale Ltd v Edwards 1969 1 SA 464 (RA). 
18  Watson v Watson 1979 4 All SA 177 (AD); Grobbelaar v Grobbelaar 2002 JOL 9617 (T); Jones v 
Jones 1970 2 SA 308 (R); Forssman v Forssman 2007 JOL 20541 (W). 
19  Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A); Mentz v Simpson 1990 4 SA 455 (A) 459; Scott v Scott 
1946 WLD 399; Smit v Smit 1980 4 All SA 52 (O); Richter v Richter 1947 3 All SA 118 (W) 123. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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2  Who is responsible for the payment of school fees in terms of the South 
African Schools Act 84 of 1996? 
 
2.1  SASA 
 
As mentioned supra, various persons are liable for the payment of school fees: the 
parents or guardian, or the legal custodian, or the person who undertakes to fulfil the 
obligation  towards  the  learner's  education  at  the  school.
20  This  definition  is 
problematic in the sense that it does not indicate which persons fall within the 
definition of each group, and if there is any priority system that schools should follow 
in approaching any of these persons.
21 In the light of the Fish Hoek Primary School 
decision, it can, however, be stated that a school can approach any of the persons 
listed in the definition for the purpose of the payment of school fees. To bring about 
more certainty in this regard, each of the liable groups of persons is scrutinised more 
closely forthwith. 
 
2.2  Parent 
 
2.2.1  Children's Act 38 of 2005 
 
The Children's Act is relevant with regard to defining the term "parent" in the SASA, 
as it purports to generally define parental responsibilities and rights in South African 
law.  The  Children's  Act  defines  a  "parent,"  in  relation  to  a  child,  to  include  the 
adoptive parent of a child, but excludes (a) the biological father of a child conceived 
through  the  rape  of  or  incest  with  the  child's  mother;  (b)  any  person  who  is 
biologically related to a child by reason only of being a gamete donor for purposes of 
artificial fertilisation; and (c) a parent whose parental responsibilities and rights in 
respect of a child have been terminated.
22 
 
                                                 
20  Section 1 SASA. 
21  Mawdsley and Beckmann 2006 De Jure 381. The definition in a statute must be given some 
meaning (R v Sachs 1953 1 SA 392 (A) 403). 
22  Section 1 Children's Act 38 of 2005. It should be noted that the responsibility of stepparents to 
pay school fees is excluded from this discussion. See in this regard MB v NB 2010 3 SA 220 
(GSJ). M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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As the maintenance duty of parents is part of their automatic parental responsibilities 
and  rights,
23  it follows that persons who have  parental responsibilities and rights 
towards the child also have the  duty to maintain the child. These persons are the 
biological mother of a child, whether married or unmarried,
24 subject to the exception 
relating to a minor mother and surrogacy not relevant to this discussion ,
25 and the 
biological father of a child if he is married to the child's mother or was married to her 
at the time of the child's conception or birth or at any time in between these dates.
26 
The third category that qualifies as having parental responsibilities and rights is the 
biological father of a child, if he meets certain criteria.
27 However, even where the 
unmarried father does not qualify for parental responsibilities and rights, his common 
law maintenance duty is not affected.
28 
 
The maintenance duty thus exists regardless of whether or not the parents were ever 
married;
29 and if the parents were married, the duty also continues after the divorce 
of the parents.
30 The basic legal principle is that both parents must maintain their 
children according to their respective means.
31 However, where one of the parents 
has paid more than his or her pro rata share, he or she may recover any amount that 
he or she has spent in excess of his or her share of the child's maintenance from the 
other parent.
32 This applies irrespective of whether the parents were ever married
33 
or how the court allocated the maintenance duty between them.
34 
 
                                                 
23  Section 18(2)(d) Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
24  Section 19(1) Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
25  Section 19(2)-(3) Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
26  Section 20 Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
27  These criteria are: (a) if at the time of the child's birth he is living with the mother in a permanent 
life-partnership; or (b) if, regardless of whether he has lived or is living with the mother he firstly 
consents to be identified or successfully applies to be identified as the child's father or pays 
damages in terms of customary law; secondly, he contributes or has attempted in good faith to 
contribute to the child's upbringing for a reasonable period; and thirdly, he contributes or has 
attempted in good faith to contribute towards expenses in connection with the maintenance of the 
child for a reasonable period (s 21(1)). This section applies regardless of whether the child was 
born before or after the commencement of the Act (s 21(4)). 
28  Section 21(2) Children's Act 38 of 2005. The father in Fish Hoek Primary School did not have 
parental  authority  (as  it  was  then  called,  prior  to  the  Children's  Act)  but  was  obliged  to  pay 
maintenance. 
29  Section 15(3)(a) Maintenance Act 99 of 1998; Jordaan and Davel Law of Persons 131. 
30  Bursey v Bursey 1999 3 All SA 289 (A) 295. 
31  Mentz v Simpson 1990 4 SA 455 (A) 457; Herfst v Herfst 1964 4 SA 27 (W) 130C. 
32  Heaton Family Law 325. 
33  Jordaan and Davel Law of Persons 132; Van der Harst v Viljoen 1977 1 SA 795 (C) 797-8. 
34  Heaton Family Law 325; Fish Hoek Primary School para 14. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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The  Children's  Act  specifically  includes  adoptive  parents  in  the  definition,  and as 
such they are responsible for the maintenance of the adopted child. Consequently, 
unless the child is adopted by a step-parent who is married to or in a civil partnership 
with the parent of the child, the biological parents of the child no longer have the duty 
to maintain their biological child once the adoption is confirmed.
35 
 
Three groups of parents are excluded from the definition of "parent" in the Children's 
Act, namely the father of a child conceived through rape or incest, a person who is 
biologically related to a child by reason only of being a gamete donor for the purpose 
of  artificial  fertilisation,  and  a  parent  whose  parental responsibilities  and  rights  in 
respect of a child have been terminated.
36 Although these persons do not have any 
parental responsibilities and rights towards the child, the question is  if they remain 
liable for the maintenance of the child, including the payment of school fees? 
 
As far as the father of a child conceived through rape or incest is concerned, he 
would be regarded as an unmarried father  who did not qualify as a parent with the 
parental  responsibilities  and  rights  of  s  21(1).  However,  as  stated  above,  his 
maintenance duty would continue in the light of s 21(2). To hold otherwise would be 
contrary to the (financial) interests of the child. 
 
The rights of a child conceived by artificial insemination are  set out in s 40 of the 
Children's Act: 
 
no right, responsibility or obligation (including the duty to pay school fees)   arises 
between  a  child  conceived  as  a  result  of  artificial  insemination  and  any  person 
whose gametes are used for such artificial insemination, unless the person is the 
woman giving birth to that child or that person was the husband of the woman at the 
time of artificial insemination.
37 
 
If a court terminated the parental responsibilities and rights of a biological parent, for 
example where  the child is given up for adoption, all responsibilities and rights 
                                                 
35  Section 20 Child Care Act 74 of 1983. An adoption order terminates all parental responsibilities 
and rights between the child and his or her biological parents. See Heaton Family Law 295. 
36  Section 1 Children's Act 38 of 2005. See 2.1 supra. 
37  There is one exception, namely surrogacy. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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between  the  biological  parent  and  the  child  are  terminated,  including  the  duty  to 
support. This would usually be made clear in the court order. 
 
It should be noted that where one or both of the parents are deceased, the duty of 
support, and thus the obligation to provide for the education of the child, moves to 
the  estate  of  a  deceased  parent.
38  The school could thus submit a claim in this 
regard to the executor of the estate for school fees, unless the child's inheritance or 
means is enough to meet his maintenance needs.
39 In such an instance the claim for 
fees lies against the child herself or himself.
40 
 
2.2.2  SASA and the non-custodian parent 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the interpretation of the term "parent" in the SASA 
has been the focus of litigation in instances where the parents are not living together. 
As the SCA in the Fish Hoek Primary School  case discussed various arguments 
raised  in  the  earlier  Roodtman  matter,  the  discussion  commences  with  a  brief 
overview of the Roodtman judgment. 
 
2.2.2.1  Roodtman 
 
The court in Roodtman had to determine the meaning of the word "parent" in the 
(now  repealed)  Education  Affairs  Act  (House  of  Assembly).
41  The  definition  of 
"parent"  in this statute reads:  "the parent of such child or the person in whose 
custody the child has been lawfully placed ."  The court found that it should be 
interpreted to mean only the custodian parent, based on the interpretation of the 
term throughout the statute.
42 The court specifically noted that to interpret the word 
"parent" broadly (to include the non-custodian parent) would lead to inequitable and 
in  some  cases  absurd  or  anomalous  consequences.  For  example,  where  the 
maintenance  obligation  of  the  non -custodian  parent  has  been  calculated  with 
reference to all of the relevant factors, including the educational needs of the child, 
                                                 
38  In re Estate Visser 1948 3 SA 1129 (C) 1135; Heaton Family Law 326. 
39  Lambrakis v Santam 2000 3 SA 1098 (W) 1109 I-J. 
40  Van Zyl Law of Maintenance 17. 
41  Education Affairs Act (House of Assembly) 70 of 1988 (Roodtman 96). 
42  Roodtman 96. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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the school in which the custodian parent enrolled the child may nevertheless sue the 
non-custodian parent for outstanding fees – even where the non-custodian complied 
with the maintenance order.
43 It concluded that the non-custodian parent is not liable 
for the payment of the outstanding school fees after a divorce.
44 The court reiterated 
that a parent who has paid more than the  pro rata share of the maintenance of the 
child  has  a  claim  against  the  other  –  irrespective  of  whether  the  share  was 
apportioned by the court or not – on the basis of undue enrichment or on negotiorum 
gestio.
45 
 
The Roodtman argument to an application brought in terms of the SASA (and not the 
Education  Affairs  Act)  was  applied  in  Bestuursraad  van  die  Laerskool  Sentraal, 
Kakamas v Van Kradenburg.
46 
 
2.2.2.2  Fish Hoek Primary School v GW
47 
 
The facts of this matter occurred prior to the promulgation of the Children's Act. The 
facts related to the school fees of a child born of unmarried parents. The biological 
father in casu was neither the custodian nor the guardian of the child. He had no 
parental authority over the child.
48 The claim for payment of the fees by the school 
was brought in terms of the SASA.
49 
 
The main argument by the school was that the term  "parent" in the SASA should be 
interpreted  wider  tha n  the  term  in  the  Education  Affairs  Act,  as  concluded  in 
Roodtman.  The  court  a  quo  disagreed,  followed  Roodtman,  and  found  that  the 
interpretation of the term "parent" in SASA should be the same as the interpretation 
of the term in the Education Affairs Act. It concluded, as did the courts in Roodtman 
and Van Kradenburg, that a different conclusion would lead to anomalies unintended 
                                                 
43  Roodtman 97. 
44  Roodtman 98. 
45  Roodtman 94. See discussion infra. 
46  Van Kradenburg para 13. 
47  Fish Hoek Primary School. For the court a quo see Fish Hoek Primary School v Welcome 2009 3 
SA 36 (C). 
48  The term "parental authority" is used as the facts occurred prior to the Children's Act. 
49  Section 40(1) SASA set out supra. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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by the legislature, particularly since the aim of these statutes is very similar and they 
are in pari materia.
50 
 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal,  however,  disagreed  with  this finding.  It  based  its 
decision on the hermeneutical principle that the literal and ordinary meaning of the 
words  should  be  used.
51  The SCA accordingly found that it was clear that the 
legislature intended a much wider meaning of the term  "parent"  in the section 
pertaining to the payment of school fees in the SASA.
52 The reliance of the court a 
quo on Roodtman was regarded as misplaced.
53 It was noted that the SASA draws a 
distinction  between  parents  as  a  general  group  and  custodian  parents,  when 
necessary. In the section dealing with the payment of school fees reference is made 
to parents as a general group and not merely custodian parents.
54 
The SCA further argued that their interpretation of the term  was  in line with the 
constitutional demand that a court must  "promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the  Bill  of  Rights  when  interpret ing  legislation."
55  Mothers  are  historically  (and 
currently) the primary care-givers of children and almost always become custodial 
parents after a divorce or breakdown of their relationship. This places an additional 
financial burden on them and the "sad reality is that they then become overburdened 
in terms of responsibilities and under -resourced in terms of means. Despite the 
constitutional promise of equality, the division of parenting roles continues to remain 
largely gender-based."
56 In the light of F v F supra the SCA recognised the need to 
be  "acutely  sensitive  to  the  possibility  that  the  different  treatment  of  custodian 
parents and their non-custodian counterparts often can, and does, constitute unfair 
gender discrimination."
57 The court found that to  interpret the SASA to exclude the 
non-custodian  parent  from  its  operation  would  frustrate  the  realisation  of  the 
constitutional goal of gender equality.
58 
 
                                                 
50  Fish Hoek Primary School (a quo) 41, 43. 
51  Fish Hoek Primary School para 6-8. The discussion of the court regarding the interpretation of 
one statute in the light of the preceding statute is disregarded for purposes of this discussion. 
52  Fish Hoek Primary School paras 5, 8. 
53  Fish Hoek Primary School para 5. 
54  Fish Hoek Primary School para 12. 
55  Section 39(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
56  Fish Hoek Primary School para 13. 
57  Fish Hoek Primary School para 13. 
58  Fish Hoek Primary School para 13. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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The court continued that their interpretation is in line with the common law duty on 
both parents to support their children in accordance with their respective means – a 
duty that extends to the educational needs of the child.
59 Furthermore, as the SASA 
provides  for  compulsory  education,  a  wider  interpretation  (thus  burdening  both 
parents with  the  duty to  pay school fees) is also in line with the constitutional 
principle of the best interests of the child.
60 
 
It, unquestionably, is in the best interests of the child that a non -custodian parent, 
who is unwilling, yet has the means to pay his child's school fees, should be made to 
do so, if necessary, by the injunction of an order of a competent court.
61 
 
The court noted that a different decision would saddle the custodian parent with all of 
the responsibility and that, although there might be a claim against the non-custodian 
parent for the amount paid more than her  pro  rata  share,  such  a  claim  is  often 
"illusory."
62 The court concluded that the sad reality is that many custodian parents 
do not have the means to pay school fees. If the school was not allowed to c laim in 
these instances from the non-custodian parent, the result would be that the school 
would have to shoulder the loss or that the school would have to mulch other parents 
with the additional burden, which would be to the detriment of other learners.
63 It 
noted that it was clear that the intention of the legislature was to cast the net as wide 
as  possible  to  include  as  many  persons  as  possible,  to  afford  the  school  the 
maximum protection.
64 
 
The decision by the SCA should be welcomed. It clarified the unc ertainty created in 
the Roodtman judgment. The crux is that the school is entitled to claim payment from 
both parents, regardless of the relationship and history between the parents, as both 
parents  are  liable  for  maintenance  in  terms  of  the  common  law.  This  is  so, 
regardless of whether or not there is an existing maintenance order or settlement 
agreement. 
 
                                                 
59  Fish Hoek Primary School para 14. 
60  Section 28(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
61  Fish Hoek Primary School para 14. 
62  Fish Hoek Primary School para 14. 
63  Fish Hoek Primary School para 14. 
64  Fish Hoek Primary School para 14. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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Three additional issues are noteworthy from the judgment: the role of the concept of 
the  best  interests  of  the  child,  the  broader  gender  issues,  and  the  dilemma  for 
divorced parents. 
 
The court in Fish Hoek Primary School reiterated that the constitutional principle that 
the best interests of the child should be of paramount importance in all matters
65 
should be decisive, and is served by holding the non -custodian parent liable for the 
payment of school fees.
66 The impact of the judgment on the non-custodian parent is 
that a liability is created for a parent without necessarily any input of that parent as to 
the school which the child attends and irrespective of whether or not the parent is in 
compliance with an existing and updated maintenance order.
67 It is submitted that 
this is correct, as any negative impact on the rights of the non -custodian parent is 
overshadowed by the rights of the child to a suitable  education. The non-custodian 
parent would be able to claim from the other parent any amount paid in excess of his 
or her  pro  rata  share  of  the  maintenance  obligation.  The  difference  is  that  the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has shifted the practical burden to reclaim any such an 
excess amount from the custodian parent to the non-custodian parent. 
 
The  sensitivity  of  the  court  to  the  gender issues  is laudable  and in  line  with  the 
Constitutional Court decision in Bannatyne v Bannatyne,
68 where the engendered 
nature of maintenance was highlighted. The Constitutional Court noted: 
 
…  on  the  breakdown  of  a  marriage  or  similar  relationship  it  is  almost  always 
mothers who become the custodial parent and have to care for the children. This 
places  an  additional  financial  burden  on  them  and  inhibits  their  ability  to  obtain 
remunerative  employment.  Divorced  or  separated  mothers  accordingly  face  the 
                                                 
65  S 28(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
66  Joubert v Joubert 2008 JOL 21929 (C) para 35. 
67  The effect of the judgment is that courts can now, in contravention of an existing (maintenance) 
court order, order that school fees must be paid by the non-custodian parent. Such a parent 
would probably already be paying an amount of maintenance in terms of a previous court order. 
This (first) court order, whether it is a high court or maintenance court order, would normally be a 
result of an investigation  made into the reasonableness of the expense  and  after taking into 
account all of the relevant factors such as the means of the parties and their standard of living. 
The (second) court, which orders the non-custodian to pay school fees, thus in effect "overrules" 
the existing order without any investigation. This seems unsatisfactory. One way to mitigate this 
problem could be to refer the issue to the maintenance court, as the payment of school fees 
would presumably qualify in terms of s 6(1)(b) of the Maintenance Act as "good cause for the 
substitution of a maintenance order." However, this option would decrease the effectiveness of 
the solution embraced by the court.  
68  Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 2 BCLR 111 (CC) paras 29-30. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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double disadvantage of being overburdened in terms of responsibilities and under-
resourced in terms of means. Fathers, on the other hand, remain actively employed 
and  generally  become  economically  enriched.  These  disparities  undermine  the 
achievement of gender equality which is a founding value of the Constitution. The 
enforcement  of  maintenance  payments  therefore  not  only  secures  the  rights  of 
children, it also upholds the dignity of women and promotes the foundational values 
of achieving equality and non-sexism. Fatalistic acceptance of the insufficiencies of 
the  maintenance  system  compounds  the  denial  of  rights  involved.  Effective 
mechanisms for the enforcement of maintenance obligations are thus essential for 
the simultaneous achievement of the rights of the child and the promotion of gender 
equality. 
 
It is submitted that the same argument is applicable to the issue of the payment of 
school fees. In practice it would assist schools in their pursuit  of the payment of 
school fees, as the liability is that of all of the parents, regardless of their marital 
status  and  the  relationships  inter  se.  The  SCA  did  what  was  required  by  the 
Constitutional Court, namely to create an additional mechanism for the enforcement 
of maintenance obligations, albeit only for a part of them. 
 
Although  this  judgment  related  in  the  first  instance  to  parents  who  were  never 
married, it is submitted that the definition of a "parent" is sufficiently wide to include 
divorced  or  separated  parents.  This  judgment  creates  a  dilemma  for  divorced  or 
divorcing parties. A settlement agreement that is made an order of court may or may 
not specify who is liable for school fees. The courts are not ad idem in this regard. In 
Du Toit v Du Toit
69 the court did not want to make a special order in addition to the 
general maintenance amount, as doing that could have made the total maintenance 
amount unreasonably large. However, in Schmidt v Schmidt
70 the court disagreed 
with this position (in a judgment later confirmed by the SCA). It noted that as school 
fees fluctuate constantly it would not be practical to quantify this amount at the time 
of the divorce.
71 In the light of  Fish Hoek Primary School, the parties were to be 
made  aware  that  the  school  could  claim  school  fees  from  either  parent  or  both 
parents in terms of the SASA, and that the arrangement of the parties inter se was 
irrelevant to the school.  
 
                                                 
69  Du Toit v Du Toit 1991 3 SA 856 (O) 860. 
70  Schmidt v Schmidt 1996 2 SA 211 (W). 
71  See also inter alia Cohen v Cohen 2003 3 SA 337 (SCA); Power v Power 2009 JOL 23848 
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2.3  Guardian 
 
The second group of persons who are liable for school fees in terms of the SASA is 
"guardians." The parental responsibilities and rights of parents as discussed supra 
would, as a rule, include guardianship of the child, unless the court has ordered 
otherwise.
72  Even after a divorce, unless sole guardianship was awarded to one 
parent in terms of the  Divorce Act,
73 both parents retain guardianship. One parent 
would, however, be appointed as the custodian. 
 
In addition, a guardian may also be a person appointed by the court. This may be 
after the guardianship of the parents is terminated, or after the death of the parents 
of the child.
74 
 
It  is  uncertain  whether  the  SASA  definition  refers  to  any  person  that  has 
guardianship over a child or only to those guardians who are not parents. In the light 
of the hermeneutical principle that every word is important,
75 it is submitted that the 
"guardian"  in the definition would refer only to guardians  who  are not parents. 
Although this overlapping of terms is not of consequence for  the purposes of  the 
payment of school fees, it is an example of the legislature 's being overly cautious 
and adding persons  ex abundanti cautela in guarding against any person's being 
omitted.
76 
 
2.4  Custodian 
 
The same argument is applicable to the custodian's being liable for the payment of 
school fees, as the custodian is generally a person with parental responsibilities and 
rights. The custodian of a child is usually the person who is responsible for the day-
to-day care and control of the child.
77 The custodian is appointed by the court upon 
                                                 
72  Section 18(2) Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
73  Section 6 Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
74  Heaton Family Law 302. 
75  Botha Statutory Interpretation 69. 
76  Botha Statutory Interpretation 69. 
77  Heaton Family Law 172; Martin v Mason 1949 1 PH B9 (N) 24. See also the definition of "care" in 
s 1 Children's Act 38 of 2005. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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the separation of the parents pending divorce, after a divorce,
78 or even where they 
never married.
79 However, the High Court may place a child in the care (the custody) 
of a third party who is not the parent of the child.
80 
 
Visser
81 rightly argues that the word "custodian" in this instance should not refer to a 
parent or guardian but to a third party. This argument is in line with the  Children's 
Act,
82 which makes provision for a  "care-giver," meaningt any person other than a 
parent and guardian, who factually cares for a child , including a foster parent. A 
person who cares for a child means any person other than a parent or guardian, who 
factually cares for a child; a person who cares for a child whilst the child is in 
temporary safe care; the person at the head of a child and youth care centre where a 
child has been placed; the person at the head of a shelter; a child and youth care 
worker who cares for a child who is without appropriate family care in the community; 
and the child at the head of a child-headed household.
83 Although the Children's Act 
does not require that such a person would be responsible for the maintenance of the 
child, the SASA does require the person to pay the school fees unless the person is 
exempted. 
 
2.5  The person who undertakes responsibility 
 
A person who undertakes the responsibility of a parent, guardian or custodian is also 
liable for the payment of school fees in terms of the SASA. This is the broadest 
                                                 
78  Section 5(1) Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953; s 6(3) Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
79  Heaton Family Law 289. 
80  Section 15 Child Care Act 74 of 1983. The Children's Act (s 23) provides for the assignment of 
the care (the custody) of the child to an interested person by order of court, but this section has 
not yet become operational. 
81  Visser 1997 TSAR 627. See also Mawdsley and Beckmann 2006 De Jure 382. 
82  Section 1 as read with s 32 Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
83  Section 1 Children's Act 38 of 2005. S 32 makes provision for the care of a child by a person not 
holding parental responsibilities and rights. S 32(1)-(2) provides that, subject to s 129 (consent to 
medical treatment and surgical operation) a care-giver may exercise any parental responsibilities 
and rights reasonably necessary to safeguard the child's health, well-being and development; 
and  to  protect  the  child  from  maltreatment,  abuse,  neglect,  degradation,  discrimination, 
exploitation, and any other physical, emotional or mental harm or hazards, including the right to 
consent to any medical examination or treatment of the child if such consent cannot reasonably 
be obtained from the parent or guardian of the child. A court may limit or restrict the parental 
responsibilities and rights of such a person (s 32(3)). However, such a person may not hold 
himself or herself out as the biological or adoptive parent of the child, or deceive the child or any 
other person into believing that that person is the biological or adoptive parent of the child (s 
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category  of  the  definition  and  the  only  one  specifically  directed  at  education.
84 
Although not defined, this person is, seemingly, a third party who is not the custodian 
but who voluntarily takes on the responsibility of the child and for  this purpose pays 
or agrees to pay the school fees of the child. In practice this would presumably be an 
extended family member not liable for maintenance, such as a step-parent.
85 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
The  SASA  casts  the  net  of  persons  liable  for  school  fees  very  wide,  to  include 
parents, guardians, custodians and those who undertake the responsibility. These 
groups  seem  to  overlap  to  some  extent,  depending  on  the  interpretation  of  the 
terms.
86 Regardless of the interpretation, though, it seems as if any of these persons 
could be approached by a school for the payment of school fees. 
 
3  Alternative legal foundations for liability for school fees 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Apart from the liability of a parent in terms of the SASA as read with the Children's 
Act and case law as set out above, there are also other bases for a claim against a 
parent.  These  include  contractual  liability,  liability  based  on  the  principle  of 
household  necessaries  irrespective  of  the  matrimonial  property  system  of  the 
parents, the principle of stipulatio alteri (where the obligation to pay school fees is set 
out in a court order),
87 and negotiorum gestio or undue enrichment. Each of these is 
briefly touched upon in turn below. 
 
                                                 
84  Mawdsley and Beckmann 2006 De Jure 383. 
85  It should be noted by schools that where the person is not legally automatically liable to make 
such payments it would be an act of vigilance to confirm the arrangement contractually. 
86  Mawdsley and Beckmann 2006 De Jure 382. 
87  Roodtman 94-5. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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3.2  Contractual obligation 
 
Visser
88 notes that it is practice in most public schools to require that at least one 
parent sign an agreement to pay school fees. As this obligation already exists in the 
SASA,
89 this contract merely affirms that position and may create a further obligation. 
Where a contract would be useful includes instances where the enrolling person 
does not qualify as a parent in terms of the SASA for the purpose of the payment of 
school fees.
90 
 
Litigation about the non -payment of school fees  has  not  been  uncommon in the 
South African law, and the disputes in earlier cases were generally contractual in 
nature.
91 
 
3.3  Household  necessaries  -  married  parents  (or  parents  in  a  civil 
partnership) living within the same household 
 
Where the parents are married or in a civil partnership and there is a joint household, 
both parents would be liable for school fees, irrespective of who the contracting party 
was  that  enrolled  the  child  in  the  school,
92  based on the principle of household 
necessaries. During the marriage, a non -contracting party may be held liable for 
household necessaries for the joint household.
93 The usual requirements should be 
met: firstly there must be a valid marriage (or civil partnership);
94 secondly, there 
must be  a joint household; and thirdly,  the fees must be regarded as household 
necessaries.
95 The decision as to whether or not the school fees would be regarded 
as household necessaries depends on various factors such as the practice and 
customs in the area, the social status of the parties, and the parents' past standard 
                                                 
88  Visser 2004 THRHR 533-537. 
89  Section 40(1) SASA. 
90  Visser 2004 THRHR 537. 
91  Hart v Forman 1905 22 SC 284; Durr v Schumann 1910 27 SC 21; Pepler v Molteno School 
Board 1912 CPD 519; Smith v Carsen 1916 EDL 26; Slivkin v Hillel College 1922 TPD 402. 
92  Roodtman 98. 
93  Sections  17(5)  and  23(5)  Matrimonial  Property  Act  88  of  1984  for  marriages  in  and  out  of 
community of property respectively (Roodtman 95); Heaton Family Law 49. 
94  Section 13 Civil Union Act, 17 of 2006. 
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of  living.
96  If the  situation does not conform to these criteria the debt   cannot be 
regarded as household necessaries or where there is no joint household, the third 
party (school) may not use this foundation as  the basis for a claim.
97 It is, however, 
unlikely that the school would base its claim on household necessaries , given the 
existence of the SASA provisions. 
 
3.4  Stipulatio alteri 
 
The court in Roodtman noted obiter that where the deed of settlement expressly 
provides for the payment of school fees by the non-custodian parent the third party 
supplier might be able to claim against the non-custodian parent on the basis of the 
stipulatio alteri.
98 No firm views on the issue were expressed, however.
99 
 
A stipulatio alteri is generally a provision in a contract between a promissory and a 
promisee with a positive intention to empower a third party to adopt and become a 
party to the contract if he/she so wishes.
100 
 
This issue was canvassed before the SCA in  Bursey v Bursey.
101 In this matter it 
was argued that a divorce settlement agreement included in the court order (that 
included the duty to pay maintenance for the children) constituted a stipulatio alteri in 
favour of the child, with the result that only the (major) child had the right to enforce 
the obligation to pay maintenance. The court disagreed with this submission since 
the original agreement had no intention of conferring any right on the child other than 
those rights flowing from the common law duty to maintain.
102 The court a quo found 
(and the SCA agreed) that there was no  "positive intention to empower the third 
party to adopt and become a party to the contract if he wishes," as required for the 
formation of a stipulatio alteri.
103 
 
                                                 
96  Heaton  Family  Law  50;  Reloomel  v  Ramsay  1920  TPD  371  374;  Voortrekker  Winkels  (Ko-
operatief) Bpk v Pretorius 1951 1 SA 730 (T) 734 D-E. 
97  Roodtman 94-5. 
98  Roodtman 95. See Boezaart Child Law 79 and discussion infra. 
99  Roodtman 95. 
100 Christie Law of Contract 266-267. 
101 Bursey v Bursey 1999 JOL 4717 (A) 16 (hereinafter referred to as Bursey). 
102 Bursey 16. 
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In the light of Bursey it is submitted that a settlement agreement, made an order of 
court,  is  not  a  stipulatio  alteri.  The  same  would  also  be  true  for  parenting  plans 
determined in terms of the Children's Act,
104 that include a maintenance obligation. A 
school would thus not be able to use the principle of  stipulatio alteri to claim school 
fees from a parent. 
 
3.5  Negotiorum gestio 
 
The next possible foundation for a school fees claim against a parent liable for the 
maintenance of the child is negotiorum gestio. It can be argued that where a third 
party fulfils the parental duty of support on behalf of a parent by supplying a minor 
with necessaries like food and clothing (or school fees) the parent may be liable on 
the basis of negotiorum gestio.
105 
 
Joubert and Van Zyl
106 describe negotiorum gestio as "the voluntary management by 
one person (the negotiorum gestor) of the affairs of another (the dominus negotii) 
without the consent or even knowledge of the latter." The crux is that the person is 
not authorised to act.
107 The intention is to manage the affairs of another and to 
recover  from  the  dominus  any  amount  spent  in  this  regard.
108  The  act  of  the 
negotiorum gestor may relate to the payment of the debts of the dominus or involve 
the maintenance of the children.
109 If these requirements are met and the negotiorum 
gestor acts in a useful and reasonable manner
110 and renders an account,
111 he/she 
is entitled to claim all of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him.
112 
 
It is submitted that the court in Roodtman was correct to note, albeit obiter, that this 
possibility should extend to the school fees of the child. Where a third party thus 
pays the school fees of the child without the consent and knowledge of the liable 
person (parent), any amount spent can then be reclaimed from the liable party in 
                                                 
104 Section 33(3)(b) and (d) Children's Act 38 of 2005.  
105 Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 156; Cockrell "Contracts" 798. 
106 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" paras 17-23. 
107 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 21. 
108 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 23. 
109 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 19. 
110 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 24. 
111 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 27. 
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terms of the principle of negotiorum gestio. However, where the negotiorum gestor 
forbids the third party from paying the amount, a claim based on this principle would 
be excluded.
113 Whether a party would, in these instances, be entitled to the amount 
paid based on unjustified enrichment is uncertain and would depend on  if it would 
"'do  justice  between  man  and  man "  and  if  there  were  "some  just  cause"  for 
disregarding the wishes of the dominus.
114 
 
3.6  Unjustified enrichment 
 
Various authors and courts have noted that a claim for the payment of maintenance 
(and, for our purposes, school fees) may be based on the principle of unjustified or 
undue enrichment. The argument is that where one person, the non-paying parent, 
unjustly  obtains  a  patrimonial  advantage  at  the  expense  of  another  person,  the 
enriched person must then reimburse the impoverished one.
115 
 
The factors to be proven are  1) that there must be actual enrichment of the one 
party, 2) the enrichment must be  at the expense of the impoverished party , 3) the 
enrichment must be unfounded, and 4) there must be no rule of law that denies the 
right of restitution of the impoverished, despite the presence of the other elements.
116 
Sonnekus
117 states that enrichment may be incurred from a diminishing of expenses 
that would, in all probability, not have taken place if it had not been for the enriching 
act (the saving of disbursements). It is submitted that  the non-payment of school 
fees would fall into this category. 
 
Where, however, the money was spent on necessaries which would have had to be 
provided in any event, it matters not that these have been consumed at the time of 
action, for the enrichment consists not in the things themselves but in the saving of 
moneys which would have otherwise have had to be applied to their purpose…. (I)f 
the necessaries would have been paid for by a parent whose duty it was to support 
the minor, it is the parent, not the minor, who is liable to the other party, either 
based on unjust enrichment or on the principle of negotiorum gestio.
118 
 
                                                 
113 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 39. 
114 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 39. 
115 Jordaan and Davel Law of Persons 80; see also Heaton Law of Persons 103; Pretorius v Van Zyl 
1927 OPD 226. 
116 Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 41-42; Du Bois Principles of South African Law 1046. 
117 Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 44. 
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The amount of enrichment claimed is determined at the time of litis contestatio.
119 
The basis for the liability is not a juristic act but solely enrichment that cannot be 
justified on any legal ground.
120 The argument is that the enriched party ( the non-
paying parent) would have had to pay the necessaries (the school fees) out of his or 
her own pocket and as such the enrichment is equal to the co sts of the necessaries 
(the school fees).
121 
 
Although a claim for  the  maintenance of a minor was turned down in  Van  Zyl  v 
Serfontein,
122 Sonnekus rightly states that this was not on principle but as a result of 
poorly drafted pleadings.
123 
 
Visser
124 argues that the challenge is to balance the right to liberty of a defendant (a 
non-paying parent) who has had the enrichment imposed on him or her, and the right 
of the plaintiff (the school) wh ich  has expended money and made the defendant 
richer. It is submitted that with school fees it is an easier balance to draw, based on 
the best interests of the child and gender equity, as discussed supra. 
 
4  Prescription 
 
Schools should be reminded that a debt for school fees would be extinguished after 
a period of three (3) years,
125 unless the prescription period is interrupted. The three 
years commence as soon as the debt is due.
126 With school fees this would usually 
be the enrolment date or the date set in the contract. If the claim is based on 
negotiorum gestio or unjustified enrichment, the prescription commences after the 
administration of the affairs has been completed or the service was supplied.
127 
                                                 
119 Du Bois Principles of the South African Law 1048; Jordaan and Davel Law of Persons 81. 
120 Jordaan and Davel Law of Persons 81 fn 204. 
121 Heaton Law of Persons 103-104. 
122 Van Zyl v Serfontein 1992 2 SA 450 (C). 
123 Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 64, 275 fn 233, 313-314. A full discussion of this judgment falls 
outside the scope of this note. 
124 Visser Unjustified Enrichment 643-644. 
125 Section 11(d) as read with s 10 Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
126 Section 12(1) Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
127 Joubert and Van Zyl "Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio" para 34; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 
75; Cockrell "Contracts" 815 respectively. In the matter of Vryburg School Board v Cloete 1955 3 
SA 355 (A) the claim for the refunding of assistance rendered in respect of lodgings for school 
children in terms of Ordinance 5 of 1921 (C) was found to have prescribed within three years 
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5  Conclusion 
 
The enforcement of the payment of school fees in South Africa is essential to the 
rights of children to receive suitable education. It is simply not possible for the State 
to provide proper education to all at state expense. Although most parents, whatever 
their relationship, are in agreement on the placement of a child at school and agree 
to the payment of the school fees, there are instances where a parent is not willing to 
fulfil his/her responsibilities in this regard even if he/she is able to do so. 
 
The SASA, as read with the Children's Act and the judgment of Fish Hoek Primary 
School, clarified the responsibility of particular persons to be directly held liable for 
the  payment  of  school  fees,  irrespective  of  their  relationship.  The  SCA  decision 
should particularly be welcomed for the sensitive nature in which the gender issues 
were dealt with. It is also laudable that schools now have a variety of legal options 
available to them for their use in the pursuit of the fees they need to collect in order 
to be able provide a satisfactory standard of education for the learners for whom they 
are responsible. In the words of Visser,
128 "the raising and proper use of school fees 
is important in the promotion of quality education." 
                                                                                                                                                        
similar  provision  is  found  in  the  current  Act  (Joubert  and  Van  Zyl  "Mandate  and  Negotiorum 
Gestio" para 34). 
128 Visser 2007 THRHR 114. M CARNELLEY                                                                        PER / PELJ 2011(14)6 
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